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NEW YORK'S STATE CONSTITUTION IN
NATIONAL CONTEXT'
Robert F. Williams*
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Our next speaker is exceptionally well-equipped to tell us how
the New York Constitution compares with the constitutions of
other states. Professor Robert Williams is the distinguished
professor of law at Rutgers University of Law in Camden, New
Jersey. He is an import from Florida, where he received his
Bachelor's Degree and his Law Degree at the University of
Florida College of Law. He served as a legislative intern at the
Florida Legislature. He has also received his L.L.M. from the
New York University School of Law and asecond L.L.M. from
Columbia Law School. He is the author of two books, State
Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials, 2 the Second Edition,
published by the Michie Company, and the New Jersey
Constitution: A Reference Guide,3 that is published by
Greenwood Press. I might add that Greenwood Press is
producing reference guides for all the states, at least twenty-eight
have been completed. These individual state guides are excellent
examples that display the constitutional law. Professor Robert F.
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law,
Camden.
' This is an expanded version of New York's State Constitution in
Comparative Context, published as Chapter 2 in THE NEw YORK STATE
CONSTITUTION: A BRIEFING BOOK (Temporary State Commission on
Constitutional Revision, Gerald Benjamin, ed., 1994) and in DECISION 1997:
CONSTIUTIONAL CHANGE IN NEw YORK 29-43 (Gerald Benjamin and Henrick
N. Dullea, ed., 1997), and is reprinted here with permission. I would like to
thank the Commission Research Director Gerald Benjamin, and Commission
Counsel Professor Eric Lane, for the opportunity to participate in the
Commission's work, and to thank Gerald Benjamin for his helpful comments
on the draft chapter, as well as this expanded version.
2 Robert F. Williams, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS
(Michie Company, 2d ed. 1993).
3 Robert F. Williams, THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONsTrrUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE (Greenwood Press, 1990).
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Williams is also the co-author of Legislative Law and Process,
also published by the Michie Company. I cannot imagine
anybody more qualified to speak on the topic, which is, "How
does the New York State Constitution compare to other
constitutions?" Please welcome Professor Robert F. Williams.
Professor Robert F. Williams:
The explanation for the comparatively small amount
of intensive professional and scholarly interest in at least
the basic study of comparative state constitutional
provisions lies to a great extent in the nature of the state
constitutional documents themselves. This can be
proved, for anyone with the necessary time and patience,
by reading ... the fifty state constitutions. With some
exceptions, the state constitutions are not notable as
masterpieces of legal draftsmanship or literary style.4
The field of state constitutional research has become
in large measure a field of comparative law, and states
that propose to amend their constitutions usually look to
the constitutional language and experience of other
states, either for example or avoidance. 5
I. Introduction
The problems of comparative research in state constitutions are
very great. Despite the obvious need for such research as
background for a state considering amending or revising its state
constitution, the indexes and comparative materials are scarce.
' See Morris M. Goldings, Massachusetts Amends: A Decade of State
Constitutional Revision, 5 HARV. J. LEGIS. 373 (1968). One commentator
stated, concerning the New York State Constitution, "probably no other large
industrial state has such a poorly drafted charter." Id. ROBERT B. DISHMAN,
STATE CONSTITUTIONS: THE SHAPE OF THE DOCUMENT, 69 (1968).
5 See Frank P. Grad, Foreword, in BARBARA FAITH SACHS, FUNDAMENTAL
LIBERTIES AND RIGHTS: A 50 STATE INDEX V (1980).
[Vol 14612
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CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON
This article is thus necessarily only a preliminary, general
comparison.
A fully developed research agenda in state constitutional law
must be comparative both with respect to other state constitutions
as well as the Federal Constitution.' Even comparisons with the
state ("subnational") constitutions in other federal systems should
be considered.7
Interestingly, New York's State Constitution is among the
better documented of the American state constitutions. 8  As
Justice Hans A. Linde has pointed out, state constitutions are not
"common law." 9 But the lessons of one state's constitutionalism
are useful in any other state. Despite Justice Linde's point that
state constitutions contain unique textual differences, they are
similar in many respects. Therefore, it is important to study,
analyze and write about state constitutional law on both a state-
specific and national basis. As I have suggested "[m]any
common themes appear in the constitutional law of all states.
They share many of the same issues, despite differences in how
Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Lav Processes, 24 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 169, 172-73 (1983) ("[S]tate constitutions do not differ significantly
from one another. . . the recurring themes and issues throughout state
constitutional law... make it susceptible to treatment on a comparative or 'all
states' basis."); See, e.g., ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTrruTIONAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1993); Robert F. Williams, Foreword: A
Research Agenda in State Constitutional Lv, 66 TEMPLE L. REv. 1145
(1993).
1 James A. Thomson, Review Essay, State Constitutional Law: Some
Comparative Perspectives, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 1059 (1989) (reviewing R.
WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES & MATERIALS (1988));
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, Comparative State Constitutional Law: A Research
Agenda on Subnational Constitutions in Federal Systems in LAw IN MOTION
339 (Roger Blanpain, ed. 1997).
s See, e.g., PETER J. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY: A CONSTITrUIONAL
HISTORY OF NEW YORK (1996); infra note 31; CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE
CONSTriUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK (5 VOLS. 1906).
1 Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law? 34 ARIZ. L. REV.
215, 229 (1992).
1998
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such issues may be resolved in each state." 10 It is literally true
that state constitutional law is a matter of "comparative American
constitutional law." 11
There has been a relatively intense scrutiny of New York's
constitution and the revision process the past few years. In May,
1993, Governor Mario Cuomo promulgated an executive order
establishing a Temporary Commission on Constitutional Revision
to make preparations for the 1997 referendum on whether to call
a constitutional convention.12
The 1993-95 Commission issued several interim reports
concerning the processes of state constitutional revision,
substantive matters, and several crucial voting rights and
apportionment matters surrounding a constitutional convention. 3
In its February, 1995 Final Report the Commission identified
four crucial areas (the state budget process, state-local relations,
education and public safety) that were in need of reform,
including the possibility of state constitutional change. The
Commission recommended the creation of "action panels,"
modeled on the National Commission on Social Security Reform
and the Federal Base Closing Commission, which would address
each of the four areas and make recommendations that the
governor and the legislature would commit ahead of time to
consider seriously. In the absence of serious consideration, and
some meaningful reform, the Commission would recommend a
positive vote on whether a constitutional convention should be
10 Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 169, 172-73 (1983) (emphasis added) (stating that [S]tate
constitutional law "usually is thought of as a parochial matter."). Id.
" I am indebted to Gisbert H. Flanz for pointing out the applicability of this
term to American state constitutional law.
12 Exec. Order No. 172, May 26, 1993, reprinted in EFFECTIVE
GOvERNMENT Now, infra note 14, at 143. Selected excerpts of the
commission's reports are reprinted in Documents, 26 RUTGERS L. J. 1355
(1995).
'3 See TEMPORARY NEW YORK STATE COMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION: THE DELEGATE SELECTION PROCESS (MARCH 1994); THE NEW
YoRK STATE CONSTITUTION: A BRIEFING BOOK (1994).
614 [Vol 14
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called in 1997."4 This was a unique approach to the problem of
state constitutional revision in an atmosphere where many people
were worried about the outcome of an unlimited state
constitutional convention.' 5 It was also a new approach to using
the periodic referendum on calling a state constitutional
convention to pressure the executive and legislature to accomplish
substantial reform prior to the referendum. It was unsuccessful,
though, and the New York voters decided in November, 1997 not
to call a constitutional convention.
New York State has long and repeated experience with
constitution making. Eight of the original thirteen states adopted
their first constitutions in 1776. That of New York, drafted
primarily by John Jay16 was adopted only one year later, placing
it among the states with the longest state constitutional
experience. One of New York's delegates to the Federal
Constitutional Convention in 1787 in Philadelphia, Robert Yates,
had been instrumental in the drafting and adoption of the 1777
New York Constitution. 17 New York is about in the middle of
the original thirteen in the number of constitutions it has adopted.
There have been four to date (that of 1777 and three in the
nineteenth century, in 1821, 1846 and 1894). Additionally, there
was one major revision in the twentieth century, in 1938,18 and
14 EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT Now FOR THE NEW CENTURY: THE FINAL
REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION 11-32 (Feb. 1995).
15 Thomas Gais and Gerald Benjamin, Public Discontent and the Decline of
Deliberation: A Dilemma in State Constitutional Reform, 68 T7EMPLE L. REV.
1291 (1995). The concerns about state constitutional conventions are
perceptively treated in this article.
16 JOHN JAY: THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY - UNPUBLISHED PAPERS
1745-1780, 389-418 (R. Morris ed. 1975); B. MASON, THE ROAD To
INDEPENDENCE: THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK, 1773-1777,
225 (1966).
'7 Alfred F. Young, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICANS OF NEW YORK: THE
ORIGINS, 1763-1797, 17 (1967).
11 Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American State Constitutions, 12
PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 57, 58 (WINTER, 1982).
1998 615
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one major failed revision, in 1967.19 New York has the second
longest state constitution, trailing a distant second behind
Alabama, where the state constitution is more than twice the
length of New York's. 20
As an original state, New York avoided the exertion of
influence over the content of its state constitution by Congress
and the President. In fact, scholarship has demonstrated that the
influence flowed in the opposite direction, with the New York
governorship, including the veto power, serving in some measure
as a model for the design of the presidency.2' Therefore,
whatever is contained in the New York constitution is of New
York origin, and not the product of nationally-imposed
preferences that often were made the price of statehood for the
non-original states. 22 As Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye has stated:
"The combination of high detail and accessibility to the
amendment process gives our Constitution a distinctive New
York character. It is a product and expression of this State." 23
She pointed out, though, that it "is a curious document --
"9 Robert B. McKay, Constitutional Revision in New York State: Disaster in
1967, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 207 (1967). For an important new, exhaustive
analysis of the 1967 Convention, See HENRIK N. DULLEA, CHARTER REVISION
IN THE EMPIRE STATE: THE POLITICS OF NEW YORK'S 1967 CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION (1997).
20 28 BOOK OF THE STATES 1990-91, 40 (Council of State Governments
1990).
2, See CHARLES THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789
(1969). See Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding
Decade: Pennsylvania's Radical 1776 Constitution and Its Influences on
American Constitutionalism, 62 TEMPLE L. REV. 541, 566 (1989). For an in-
depth study of New York's veto provision, see FRANK M. PRESCOTT & JOSEPH
F. ZIMMERMAN, THE POLITICS OF THE VETO OF LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK
STATE (1980).
22 See PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC:
JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1775-1787, 43-46
(1983); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 15-19, 76-90 (2d ed. 1993).
1 See Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 399, 409 (1987).
616 [Vol 14
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particularly when compared with the United States
Constitution."' She continued:
Given its laborious detail, our Constitution may not in every
phrase ring with the majesty of Chief Justice Marshall's
declaration: "it is a constitution we are expounding." But it
is a constitution we are expounding, and its commands are
therefore entitled to the particular deference that courts are
obliged to accord matters of constitutional magnitude. To
borrow former Chief Judge Breitel's eloquent words, in
overturning the moratorium on enforcement of city
obligations as violative of the state constitutional requirement
of a pledge of faith and credit: "it is a Constitution that is
being interpreted and as a Constitution it would serve little of
its purpose if all that it promised, like the elegantly phrased
Constitutions of some totalitarian or dictatorial Nations, was
an ideal to be worshipped when not needed and debased when
crucial. " 2
5
New York's Constitution, and its judicial interpretation, are of
great interest to others around the country.?
Alexander Hamilton pointed proudly to the New York
Constitution in the very first number of The Federalist, where he
assured New Yorkers that the new Federal Constitution was an
"analogy to your own State constitution.... "= In his
Federalist No. 66, Hamilton defended the Federal Constitution's
provision for the trial of impeachments in the Senate against the
charge that it was an unwise blending of judicial and legislative
authority, noting that the Constitution of New York made
essentially the same provision.
24 1d. at 408.
25Id. at 411.
6 Robert F. Williams, Foreword: New York Constitutional Law: The State
and Nation Watch, 8 TouRo L. REv. i (1992).
2 THE FEDERALIST No. 1 at 6 (A. Hamilton) (Modem Library ed. 1937). In
Number 69, Hamilton defended the proposed four-year term for the President
by referring to the "close analogy between him and a governor of New York,
who is elected for three years . . " Id. No. 69, at 446 (A. Hamilton)
(emphasis in original).
6171998
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In fact, too, in addition to influencing the national document,
New York's constitution was a model for other states as they
drafted or revised their state constitutions. For example, "the
Iowa and New York constitutions lay behind virtually every
section of the Californian's [1849] document." 28
Each of New York's constitutions has built on the preceding
one, while reflecting the principle political concerns and theories
of governance that prevailed at the time of its drafting. Several
commentators who studied a number of state constitutional
conventions, including New York's 1967 convention, noted the
importance of understanding the political, social and cultural
context of state constitution making and constitutional
development:
[C]onstitutional revision is a political process. As such it
does tap the full range of motives and interests called into
play by the other political subprocesses at the state level.
And like these other forms of state politics, it varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction in response to local differences in
political culture and style.29
In addition to the successes of the past, the current content of
the New York constitution also displays the influences of
ostensibly failed efforts at constitutional revision in the state, for
example those of 1867, 1915 and 1967. In fact, these
conventions substantially set the constitutional change agenda for
New York for decades after their initial proposals were rejected
at the polls. Constitutional Commissions have also played a
major role in state constitutional change in New York.30
28 See DAVID ALAN JOHNSON, FOUNDING THE FAR WEST: CALIFORNIA,
OREGON, AND NEVADA, 1840-1890, 102 (1992). See also Christian G. Fritz,
The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observations on
State Constitution - Making in the Nineteenth Century West, 25 RUTGERS L.J.
945, 978-79 (1994).
29 ELMER E. CORNWELL, JR. ET AL., STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS: THE POLITICS OF THE REVISION PROCESS IN SEVEN STATES,
192 (1975). See also Henrik N. Dullea, supra note 19.
o See Robert F. Williams, Are State Constitutional Conventions Things of the
Past? The Increasing Role of the Constitutional Commission in State
618 [Vol 14
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Alterations occurred too in New York as a result of the major
waves of state constitutional change that swept the region and
nation.
It is therefore evident that New York's Constitution cannot be
viewed in a one-dimensional way, as though it were simply
drafted all at "one sitting." Rather, it must be seen as the
culmination of centuries of experience and an enormous array of
influences. The result is a layered, or multidimensional
document.3 As in other states, the state constitution in New
York can be seen as a "mine of instruction for the natural history
of democratic communities," 32 reflecting "the romance, the
poetry and even the drama of American politics" 33 in the unique
New York context. Further, it is the very nature of this
experience that it is never finished.
One of the leading experts on state constitutions and
constitution making in this century, Frank P. Grad of the
Columbia Law School, had little patience for the notion that there
is an "ideal" state constitution. Rather, Grad wrote:
[W]e must be content with something less than the Platonic
ideal; we must aim rather for a constitutional document that
is designed to enable the state to carry on its work of
government today and in the foreseeable future with
efficiency and economy and with minimum interference by
unnecessary restrictions .... .'
Constitutional Change, 1 HOFSTRA LAW & POLICY SYMP. 1, 11-14 (1996);
Peter J. Galie and Christopher Bopst, Changing State Constitutions: Dual
Constitutionalism and the Amending Process. Id. at 27, 40-46.
31 For excellent consideration of each section's origins, see PETER J. GALIE,
THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1991) and
ROBERT ALLAN CARTER, NEW YORK STATE CONsTTrTION: SOURCES OF
LEGIsLATIVE INTENT (1988).
32 See JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH, 434 (2d Ed. 1891).
33 JAmES Q. DEALEY, GROWTH OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTrrTloNs, 11
(1915).
1 Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our
Time, 54 VA. L. REv. 928, 928-29 (1968). See also Model Stale Constitution,
New York: National Municipal League, 1963.
1998 619
9
Williams: Constitutional Comparison
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998
TOURO LAW REVIEW
Because there is no "ideal" state constitution, because political
influences are different from state to state, and because the
Federal Constitution performs a different function from state
constitutions, comparisons should be made with caution. With
these cautionary points in mind, there is great value to examining
generally New York's current state constitution in comparative
context.
II. New York's State Constitution
A. Article I The Bill of Rights
The New York Bill of Rights did not appear in the original
1777 constitution. That document, like those of the other original
states without separate bills of rights, did protect a variety of
rights, such as jury trial, freedom of religion, and due process
within the body of the constitution itself.35 Robert C. Palmer has
argued that decisions, like in New York, not to include a separate
Declaration of Rights, "indicated no less social value attributed to
rights. "3 6
Seeming individual liberties in the body of the constitution,
stated in mandatory form, were concerned primarily not
with individuals, but with the structure of government. Not
only did the New York constitution not have a declaration
of rights, its concern was so thoroughly consumed with
establishing a liberty-enhancing republican government that
nowhere did the constitution explicitly address the
protection of individual rights."
3' See Galie, supra note 31, at 4.
36 Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional Provisions, 1776-1791 in
William E. Nelson and Robert C. Palmer, Liberty and Community:
Constitution And Rights In The Early American Republic 55, 61 (1987). He
continued: "Adopting a constitution without a declaration of liberties, as four
states did, did not establish that such a state was more arbitrary or less free
than states with declarations; liberties, in these four states, were usually
mentioned somewhere in their constitutions." Id. at 75.
37 Id. at 79.
620 [Vol 14
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In 1821, a separate bill of rights was adopted, forming the basis
for the current article which, like in most states now, comes at
the beginning of the constitution. New York's Bill of Rights is in
many respects similar to those of the other states." The specific
provisions reflect amendments over the years to accommodate
pragmatic recognition of what are thought to be the necessities of
modem state government. For example, Article I, § 1,
concerning disenfranchisement was amended in 1959 to permit
the legislature to dispense with primary elections under certain
circumstances. Article I, § 2 regarding the right to jury trial has
been amended to permit non-unanimous jury verdicts if the
legislature so desires. Article I, § 7 also reflects a similar
modem modification in section (d).
The guarantee of freedom of speech contained in Article I, § 8
is, as in many states, an affirmative statement of the right, rather
than a negative limitation on government such as is found in § 9.
This has led some states, but not New York, with similar
provisions to construe them to apply to free speech and assembly
activities on certain private property such as private university
campuses and shopping malls.
The detailed regulation of gambling in Article I, § 9 is not
unusual for state constitutions, because of its highly political and
morally charged content, 39 but it is unusual to find it treated in the
bill of rights. State constitutional regulation of gambling is more
often found in the legislative article.
New York's equal protection provision, Article 1, § 11, is quite
unusual because the second sentence, on its face, seems to apply
to private as well as state action. The courts, however, have not
accorded this much recognition.' Montana apparently modeled
its equal protection provision on New York's.4
38 See generally Barbara Faith Sachs, supra note 5; Mark L. Glasser and
John Kincaid, Selected Rights Enumerated in State Constitutions, 17
Intergovernmental Perspective 35 (Fall, 1991); Ronald K. L. Collins, Bills and
Declarations of Rights Digest, in THE AMERICAN BENCH 2483 (1985).
31 See Grad, supra note 34, at 950 n. 66, 955-56.
40 N.Y. CONST. art. I § 11. By its terms, it does not require state action but
the New York courts have read this requirement into it. See e.g., Dorsey v.
Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949); Holy Spirit
1998 621
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The search and seizure protection in Article I, § 12 includes a
modem provision extending its protection to "unreasonable
interception of telephone and telegraph communications." This
provision is found in only a few state constitutions, and is another
example of a modem modification of a much older, core
42constitutional protection.
The Article I, § 16 prohibition on limiting recoveries for
wrongful death is also present in a number of states, reflecting a
specific, substantive distrust of the legislature arising from actual
experience. Under the pressure of powerful railroad employer
interests, state legislatures passed statutes limiting recovery for
wrongful death at the end of last century, leading to provisions
like this. Other examples may be found in the constitutions of
Kentucky and Pennsylvania.
The recognition of labor rights in Article I, § 17 is relatively
unusual; it is found in only five other state constitutions.43 New
York led the way in this regard, as it did in constitutionalizing a
number of other social policy concerns in 1938. Florida,
Missouri, New Jersey, and Hawaii all adopted or modified their
constitutions after 1938, perhaps emulating New York's provision
in this area. Finally, the workers' compensation provision,
Article I, § 18 is very common in state constitutions for two
reasons. First, like in New York, such a provision was necessary
Ass'n. v. New York State Congress of Parents & Teachers, Inc., 95 Misc. 2d
548, 552, 408 N.Y.S. 2d 261, 265 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1978);
Antinore v. State, 79 Misc. 2d 8, 13, 356 N.Y.S. 2d 794, 800 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1974). For a recommendation to overrule the state action
requirement, See J. WEINSTEIN, ESSAYS ON THE NEW YORK CONSTITUTION II
41 to 43 (1966).
" Tia Rikel Robbin, Untouched Protection from Discrimination: Private
Action in Montana's Individual Dignity Clause, 51 MONT. L. REv. 553, 557-
58 (1990).
42 See generally Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure
Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals' Quest for Principled
Decisionmaking, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1996).
43 See Richard A. Goldberg and Robert F. Williams, Farmworkers'
Organizational and Collective Bargaining Rights in New Jersey: Implementing
Self-Executing State Constitutional Rights, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 729,731-32
(1987).
622 [Vol 14
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in some states to overcome a decision of the highest state court
holding that the legislature was without power to establish a
system of workers' compensation. New York's experience in this
regard with the famous Ives44 case is among the most well-known
examples of a state constitution being amended to "overrule" a
state court interpretation of the state constitution. Other states
that have these provisions included them to eliminate doubt about
statutory workers' compensation schemes because of alleged jury
trial, access to court, and other potential constitutional
impediments.
Overall, New York's Bill of Rights is comparable to those in
most states, subject to the exceptions noted above. However, it
does not contain a guarantee of equal rights for women (a "state
ERA") as is now present in about one-third of the states.45 The
New York Bill of Rights also does not contain constitutional
protection for persons with disabilities, which has been adopted in
a few states.
B. Article II: Suffrage
Article H- has its origins in the Revolutionary debates over the
right to vote, as well as in the 1821 Constitutional Convention,
which has been referred to as "one of the great suffrage debates
in American history." 46
Currently, it covers much of the same ground as will be found
in other constitutions, such as basic qualifications, absentee
voting, registration, and disqualification from the right to vote.
As noted elsewhere in this volume, many of the New York
provisions on Suffrage are now invalid because they are in
conflict with the United States Constitution or federal statutes as
4Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
45 See Robert F. Williams, The New Jersey Equal Rights Amendment: A
Documentary Sourcebook, 16 RUTGERS WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 69 (WINTER
1994).
46 See Galie, supra note 31, at 7 (quoting CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN
SUFFRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860, 195 (1960)). See
also MERRILL D. PETERSON, DEMOCRACY, LmERTY, AND PROPERTY: THE
STATE CONSTrrTUnONAL CONVENTIONS OF THE 1820's 125, 187-233 (1966).
1998
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interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. The special
provision contained in § 9 with respect to presidential elections,
quite common in state constitutions, is essentially mandated by
federal law. The New York Constitution contains somewhat
more detailed provisions regarding voter registration and election
administration than generally found in state constitutions.
C. Article III. Legislature
Article III concerns the basic lawmaking branch of state
government, and sets forth its basic structure, the qualifications
for service as a legislator, and the method for designing
legislative districts. 47 Like in all of the states but one (Nebraska),
it establishes a bicameral legislature. In Article III, § 2 the use of
the term "assemblymen" reflects the absence of gender neutrality
toward which some states have moved in their constitutions.
Part of the responsibility to reapportion the legislature is
assigned by § 4 to the legislature, where it has traditionally
resided. Some other states, in recent times, have amended their
constitutions to assign the politically difficult task of
reapportionment to a commission set up specifically for this
purpose. 48  These commissions typically develop a
reapportionment plan which is then subject to direct review by the
state's supreme court, without any involvement by the legislature
itself.
The provisions with respect to senate districts (§ 4) and
assembly districts (§ 5) are, as in many states, subject to the
overriding mandates of the federal one-person-one-vote decisions
and the Voting Rights Act, where it applies. This is confusing. It
leaves some but not all aspects of the state constitutional
47 Robert F. Williams, Comment: On The Importance Of A Theory Of
Legislative Power Under State Constitutions, 15 QUINNIPiAC L. Rnv. 57
(1995).
48 See Bruce Adams, A Model State Reapportionment Process: The
Continuing Quest for "Fair and Effective Representation, 14 HARV. J. LEGIS.
825 (1977).
624 (Vol 14
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provisions on this subject without force or effect. But it is not a
uncommon situation.
The provisions on compensation and expenses (§ 6) and
qualifications and the ban on certain civil appointments, "to an
office which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof
shall have been increased," are very common among most of the
states.
The content of sections 8-11 is quite standard in most
constitutions, though the provision in section 12 that "any bill
may originate in either house" diverges from that of some states
which include the more rigid requirement that revenue bills
originate in the House. The section 13 requirement that only bills
are valid to enact law is standard, and reflects the notion that
legislative actions short of bills, such as resolutions, are not
available to enact a formal law. The limitations on the passage of
laws contained in sections 14-17 are also fairly standard, although
states vary on the approach taken to private and local bills (§17)
and a number of other states expand this prohibition to cover
"special" legislation. 49  The special laws provisions in other
states are generally aimed at legislative classifications, and in
most states are thought to be similar to equal protection
guarantees.
The provision in § 18 permitting the legislature to call itself
into session, common in most states, serves as a compliment to
the governor's power to call special sessions.
The remaining sections of Article IUi each reflect issues treated
in some other state constitutions in comparable ways.50 Section
24 serves as a substantive limit on the legislature. The provision
for emergency government included in § 25, reflecting the
attitudes of the day in 1963, is similar to the relatively untested
provisions contained in some other state constitutions.
Legislative term limitation, adopted in almost all states with
initiative and referendum, is not present in New York, which
49 Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63
TEX. L. REv. 1195, 1209-10 (1985).50 See generally BARBARA FAITH SACHS, LAWS, LEGISLATURE, LEGISLATIVE
PROCEDURE: A FIFTY STATE INDEX (1982).
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does not provide for these techniques of direct democracy, or for
recall of elected officials, in its constitution.
D. Article IV: Executive
The relatively streamlined executive article reflects the standard
powers and duties of the governor. Unlike New York, more than
half the states limit the number of terms a governor may serve.
The policy choice in section 1 of having the governor and
lieutenant governor "chosen jointly" is found in some other states
that have lieutenant governors. Other states specify that they run
independently. Their joint election notwithstanding, the separate
nomination of the governor and lieutenant governor in New York
has sometimes led to incompatibility between them.
The mechanisms for succession in office, or the "devolution of
the duty of acting as governor," is reflected in fairly standard
terms in § 6.
The executive veto power in § 7, the original 1777 version of
which served as a partial model for the Federal Constitution's
veto power, now includes a somewhat restricted version of the
item veto. The text of the provision seems limited to veto of
"items of appropriation of money." Some other states do not so
restrict item veto, permitting the governor to veto substantive
provisions in appropriation bills, and, under some circumstances,
proviso language or "riders" in appropriation bills.
Finally, the limitation on the effectiveness of administrative
rules, reflected in §8, is found in a number of states, and is a
reaction to the importance of law making by agency regulation in
the modern administrative state.
"' See generally Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMPLE
L. REV. 1171 (1993).
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E. Article V: Officers and Civil Departments
Article V reflects the reality in many states today. In many
states, the governor is not the Executive, but is rather a part of
the Executive. This was one of Woodrow Wilson's favorite
points about executive powers under state constitutions. In fact,
however, the executive power is less dispersed among other
constitutionally empowered actors in New York than in most
other states. Section 1 establishes the Comptroller and Attorney
General as statewide, elected officials. In the other sections
contained in Article V the constitutional duties of these offices are
established. Unlike in some states, California for example, the
Attorney General in New York has virtually no role in overseeing
or coordinating the criminal justice process.
The limitation in § 2 to "twenty civil departments in the state
government" is contained in some other state constitutions, and
reflects an attempt to force a reorganization of, and to pinpoint
responsibility for, the many administrative agencies in the
executive branch.
The appointing and removal powers given the governor in
Section 4 are relatively extensive, though this official in New
York lacks the constitutional authority to reorganize the executive
branch given to the chief executive in a number of other states.
Civil service provisions, such as contained in § 6, are fairly
common in state constitutions."
F. Article V: Judiciary
State constitutional judiciary articles are among the hardest to
compare. They often include a high level of detail with respect to
the establishment of different courts and their jurisdiction. New
York's judiciary article is no exception. It begins to provide for
a unified court system (§l.a.), further unification remains a goal,
and sets out the basic structure of the state-wide court system.
Some detail is required because of special treatment for courts in
I See Grad, supra note 34, at 961.
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New York City, making the judicial article another in which the
city's presence in the state is manifest constitutionally.
As with other state constitutions, the article deals not only with
the establishment of courts and their jurisdiction, but with the
selection of judges, their qualifications, terms, and provisions for
their removal. States employ five different systems for the
selection of judges: merit selection, appointment by the governor,
election by the legislature, nonpartisan election and partisan
election. New York is one of twenty-one states with a variant of
merit selection for its high court. The Commission on Judicial
Nomination for the Court of Appeals provided for in § 2.d. is
similar to those in a few states. Eleven states use partisan
election for some level of their judiciary, the system employed in
New York for most other judgeships. 3 The Commission on
Judicial Conduct in New York, established in § 22, is less
common among the states.
The provisions in § 24 concerning the impeachment power of
the legislature seem oddly placed within the judicial article.
Although the content of § 24 is similar to most states, these
provisions are usually contained in the legislative article. The
apparent rationale here is the description of the senate trial in an
impeachment matter as the "court for trial of impeachments."
Technically, though, impeachment is a legislative and not a
judicial power.
The provision in § 30, recognizing the power of the legislature
over questions of practice and procedure in the courts is
somewhat unusual today. Many state constitutions assign this
power to the highest court, with only the possibility, in fewer
states, of some shared legislative power.
G. Article VII. State Finances & Article VIII: Local
Finances
Sections 1 through 5 of Article VII establish the modern
executive budget making process. There are similar provisions in
53 See G. ALAN TARR, JUDICIAL PROCESS AND JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 67
(1994).
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many other state constitutions, but this is a strong version, and
some states (South Carolina, for example) still lack such a
process. The second paragraph of § 1, apparently based on
separation of powers concerns, permits the proposed judicial and
legislative budgets to be submitted directly to the legislature,
subject only to the governor's power to comment thereon. The
§ 6 restriction on other appropriations bills being limited to a
single object or purpose is contained in a number of other state
constitutions, but is often worded differently from this section.
The provision in § 7 that no money should be paid out except
pursuant to appropriation by law is very common, as are the
limitations on state credit contained in § 8. The accretion of
exceptions reflected in § 8 is also very common, authorizing the
reintroduction of state government financing into a variety of
modem activities.
Otherwise, state constitutional provisions on the limitation of
borrowing and spending are quite common, but difficult to
compare in their detailed provisions.m This holds true for the
rest of Article VII and the entirety of Article VIII. Furthermore,
Article VIII, Section 7 evidences the recognition of the need to
treat a city like New York differently. This reality appears
elsewhere in the New York Constitution, and is to a certain extent
reflected in other state constitutions where there is the presence of
a large, dominant city or a few such cities.
H. Article IX: Local Governments
Section 1, the "Bill of Rights for Local Governments," is an
attempt to set forth a version of constitutional home-rule for local
government.55 Importantly, it refers to the "power to adopt local
laws .... " (Section l(a)). These powers seem dependent on
I See generally M. David Gelfand, Seeking Local Government Financial
Integrity Through Debt Ceilings, Tax Limitations, and Expenditure Limits: The
New York City Fiscal Crisis, The Taxpayers' Revolt and Beyond, 63 MINN. L.
REv. 545 (1979).
5 See generally Richard Briffault, Local Government and the New York State
Constitution, 1 HoFsTRA LAW & POLIcY SYMP. 79 (1996).
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legislative implementation (see Section 2), subject to the
limitations contained in Section 1. Furthermore, the provision
sets up a dichotomy between local matters and statewide matters.
This distinction has been abandoned in some state constitutions
because of the difficulties in separating state and local matters,
leading to the necessity of continuous judicial resolution of
disputes.
In other states, the constitutional treatment of local government
ranges all the way from self-executing grants of power over any
topic that the state legislature could consider (such as Alaska), to
essentially no constitutional treatment at all (such as New Jersey).
L Article X Corporations
The state constitutional treatment of corporations is found in a
number of constitutions, mostly in states in the West. This article
reflects concerns about corporations and banks that dates from the
Jacksonian era.56 Like in other states, but in language that is in
fact less limiting than that used elsewhere, this article seeks to
set forth rules for corporations and banks that are beyond the
reach of the legislature, reflecting a lack of trust in the
legislature.57
J. Article XI. Education
New York's education article is briefer than those in most
states. The § 1 requirement of "the maintenance and support of a
system of free common schools" is one of a number of different
state constitutional formulations of this legislative mandate.58
51 See Johnson, supra note 28, at 102-03; MARVIN MEYERS, THE
JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF 199-204 (1957).
" For a strong criticism of the inclusion of even more detailed regulation of
corporations in the Oklahoma Constitution, see Robert L. Stone, Article Nine
of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma of 1907 and Comparative
Constitutional Law, 17 OKLA. CITY U.L. REv. 89 (1992).
" See William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana,
Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on Public School Finance Reform Litigation,
19 J. L.& EDUC. 219 (1990).
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Stronger, more directive language has been critical in decisions of
state high courts in some states, but not in New York, to
intervene to compel massive restructuring of state educational
systems and education financing schemes.5 9
The constitutionally based board of regents appointed by the
legislature, the governance structure for all education set out in
Section 2, is one of several models used in the states. 6 Other
states employ statewide officials, elected boards or boards
appointed by other means for this function.
Unlike many states, New York lacks a constitutionally
prescribed structure for its state university system.
Finally, the § 3 restriction on public aid to religious schools,
with the exception for transportation can be found in some other
state constitutions.
K. Article XII: Defense
This one-section article, concerning the militia covers a topic
found in many state constitutions. Because of the dominance of
federal law in this area, these type of provisions have lost their
importance in modern times.6'
L. Article XIII: Public Officers
This article contains miscellaneous provisions concerning terms
of office, vacancies, oaths of office, removal from office, and
compensation for a variety of public officials. These kinds of
provisions, in more or less detail, are found in most state
constitutions. More recently, modern ethics provisions have
59 Jennifer M. Palmer, Comment, Education Funding: Equality Versus
Quality -Must New York's Children Choose? 58 ALB. L. REv. 917 (1995).
60 See Joseph Beckham, Reasonable Independence for Public Higher
Education: Legal Implications of Constitutionally Autonomous Status, 7 J. L.&
EDUC. 177 (1978).
61 See generally, Anthony J. Scaletta, Note, The Governor's Troops Under
the Florida Constitution, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1133 (1994); and Dishman, supra
note 4, at 43-47 (stating that these provisions are "obsolete.").
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begun to appear in state constitutions, though not yet in New
York's.
The treatment in § 13 of sheriffs (as recently amended in 1989
to make counties liable for the acts of its sheriff), district
attorneys, and other officials is probably a bit more detailed than
will be found in most state constitutions.
The provision in § 14 concerning the power of the legislature to
require payment of the "prevailing wage" seems at the very least
to be misplaced in this article, being more appropriately
contained in the legislative article. Secondly, it is not clear why
such a provision is necessary, since presumably the legislature
would have the power to provide by law for this matter without
specific constitutional authorization. It may be here, of course, to
overcome some judicial interpretation or constitutional doubt, or
to please groups especially interested in having this protection in
the constitution.
M. Article XIV: Conservation & Article XV Canals
These two - articles, dealing with state owned and state
controlled lands, and the consequences of the building of state
supported canals, are not common in other state constitutions.
Provisions aimed at the similar problems, however, can be found
in some state constitutions. 62
The Article XIV provisions on conservation reflect an early
policy decision to remove certain state lands from legislative
control, as well as the later accretions of exceptions, each of
which must be voted upon by the people. Few states deal with
these matters in as great detail as is found here.
The general policy statements about conservation and natural
resources contained in Article XIV, § 4 are found in a number of
62 In Western states, for example, where water resources are an important
issue, the matter of water rights is treated in state constitutions. See GORDON
MoRRIs BAKKEN, ROCKY MOUNTAIN CONSTITUTION MAKING: 1850-1912, 65-
73 (1987).
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state constitutions, utilizing a variety of different language.63
Some states include these type of provisions in their Bills of
Rights.
N. Article XVI. Taxation
All state constitutions now include detailed provisions on
taxation, which serve to limit the range of legislative and local
government choice. In fact, perhaps because of the absence of
initiative and referendum in New York, the state constitution is
less limiting regarding taxation than in many other states. The
exemption provisions in § 1 are common in most state
constitutions. Interestingly, the New York constitution does not
seem to contain an explicit "uniformity" provision for taxation.6'
Section 2 comes the closest to this concept.
Many states have added provisions such as § 6 which ease the
strict limitations on tax exemptions, tax abatements, and debt
limitations for the purpose of urban redevelopment projects which
are seen to be included in the role of modem government.
0. Article XVII: Social Welfare & Article XVIII: Housing
These two articles, recognized around the country as the 1938
Constitutional Convention's contribution to modem social welfare
theory, are substantially more detailed than most state
constitutions. Some states have, however, picked up some of the
ideas contained in these two articles. They form the basis for
' See Jose Fernandez, State Constitutions, Environmental Rights Provisions,
and the Doctrine of Self-Execution: A Political Question? 17 HARv.
ENViRONmENTAL L. REv. 333, 361-65 (1993); Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: The Potential Role of
Substantive Guidance, 27 RuTGERS L.J. 863, 872 (1996) ("Of those provisions
that mandate legislative action without creating separate environmental rights
or duties, only New York's addresses enforcement, permitting citizens to sue
with the consent of the state's supreme court; all others are silent regarding
enforcement.").
6 See generally, WADE J. NEwHOUSE, CONSTrrUTIONAL UNIFoRTrrY AND
EQUALrrY iN STATE TAXATION (2d ed. 1984).
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what is now seen as the special contribution of state constitutions
to "positive rights."'
Much of what is contained in Article XVIII with respect to
housing consists of exceptions to the rigid limitations on
indebtedness, eminent domain, and the general public purpose
doctrine.
Section 10 of Article XVIII contains an interesting provision
("shall not be construed as imposing additional limitations") that
is aimed at avoiding interpretation by "negative implication."'
P. Article XIX: Amendments to Constitution
Virtually all state constitutions now contain specific provisions
concerning the mechanisms for constitutional change. The
method used by New York for change through the legislature,
passage by two sessions followed by citizen approval at
referendum, is one of the two most commonly used.67 The New
York article contains the Jeffersonian idea of an opportunity to
revise the state constitution for each generation (§ 2). Not
included is a provision for state constitutional change by
initiative, which is contained in a number of other, mostly
western, state constitutions. The detailed New York
constitutional provisions for election of delegates to a
constitutional convention are paralleled by those in Missouri, but
few other states. The constitutions of Ohio and South Dakota
provide for non-partisan election of delegates.
IH. Conclusion
Judge Joseph W. Bellacosa recently made the following
observations about the New York Constitution:
65 See Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of
Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L. J. 881 (1989).
Grad, supra note 34, at 964-68.
67 For an excellent analysis of this mechanism, see Gerald Benjamin and
Melissa Cusa, Amending the New York State Constitution Through the
Legislature in DECISION 1997: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN NEW YORK 385
(1997).
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To be sure, the State Constitution in the overall is a lengthy
and highly detailed document. While its largely non-self-
executing rights are sometimes characterized as
technicalities, they are, within a proper and reflective
perspective, the embodiment of protections built on history
and fair-minded principles that have withstood the test of
time and experience. It is not too much to ask that the
requirements be satisfied rather than evaded or eroded for
the sake of situational expediency.6'
New York's Constitution can be better understood through a
comparative lens. Regardless, however, of any favorable or
unfavorable comparisons, it remains the highest law of New York
State. It is, most emphatically, a constitution.
I People v. Trueluck, 88 N.Y.2d 546, 550, 670 N.E.2d 977, 979, 647
N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (1996).
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